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JUSTIFYING INDIA’S PATENT POSITION TO THE UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Srividhya Ragavan, Sean Flynn and Brook Baker*
INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2013, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means Committees using
the powers under section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 19301, requested the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to institute an investigation2 on
issues relating to Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India, with
particular reference to its effects on the United States. In their request, the
Committee requested the ITC to conduct an investigation regarding Indian
industrial policies that discriminate against U.S. imports and investment for
the sake of supporting Indian domestic industries, and the effect that those
barriers have on the U.S. economy and U.S. jobs.3 Following this, the
Secretary of the US ITC instituted the investigation formally requesting
reports at a public hearing to particularly determine the competitiveness of
India’s economy by examining whether India had any significant restrictive
trade and FDI policies currently maintained or recently adopted and
whether exports of US firms are affected and the measure of such effect.
The investigation focused on agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors,
as well as the overall business environment.4 The ITC’s overview
particularly considered changes in tariff and nontariff measures, including
measures relating to the protection of intellectual property rights, and other
*
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Srividhya Ragavan, Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law,
Norman, OK – 73034;
Sean Flynn, Associate Director and Lecturer in Law, American University
Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property, Washington D.C. 20016;
Brook Baker, Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston,
MA 02115.
19 U.S.C. §1332(g)
ITC Investigation No. 332-543
International Trade Commission, Notice for Investigation No. 332-543, Aug. 29,
2013. See also Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 2, FR Doc. 2013–31487, Jan. 3, 2014
(notice of the USTR)
See International Trade Commission, Notice for Investigation No. 332-543, Aug. 29,
2013
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actions taken by India’s government to facilitate or restrict the inflow of
trade and FDI.
The paper below largely is an extract of the testimonial filed by the
authors to the Secretary of the ITC in response to the Notice on the
Federal Register dated August 29, 2013 titled Trade, Investment, and Industrial
Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy. Where required, the paper also
draws from the written submissions that the authors made to the United
States Trade Representative’s (hereinafter, USTR) office on the related
question of whether India deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S.
persons who rely on intellectual property protection.5 The authors
submitted the testimonials to the ITC as well as the USTR and as legal
academics with expertise in patent law, trade law, the TRIPS agreement and
the law of India. Each of the authors had engaged in this field for more
than 10 years and has closely followed the developments within India in
relation to the prescriptions of the TRIPS agreement.
The authors, as legal academics asserted the core point that,
whatever effect India’s policies may have on the profits on multinational
companies, including those headquartered in the U.S., India’s recent
enactment and implementation of its patent law is fully in accord with the
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).6 Further, the authors asserted that
India has demonstrated its adherence to TRIPS and to non-protectionism
and a national treatment regime by revamping its systems, instituting
massive changes to further intellectual property rights and by establishing
prudent IP standards that apply equally to both domestic and foreign
companies. Each of these standards remains in conformity with the TRIPS
agreement and carefully calibrated to accommodate its national objectives
within the scope of the flexibilities accorded under the TRIPS agreement.
5
6

See Post-hearing submissions of Ragavan, Flynn and Baker, Notice of the USTR,
Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 2, FR Doc. 2013–31487, Jan. 3, 2014
Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994),
reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365
(1995). See also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 307 (last revised July 14, 1967)
(hereinafter Paris Convention).
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The authors further reiterated that countries remain free after
TRIPS to tailor their intellectual property laws to their domestic social,
economic and cultural needs as they define them, within the bounds of the
treaty. Accordingly, as recognized within the World World Trade
Organization and the TRIPS Agreement, there is a great deal of lawful
pluralism among WTO Members about standards of patentability and
about key flexibilities, including both patentable subject matter and grounds
for compulsory licenses. India’s laws and implementation thus far remain
well within the lawful pluralism allowed by TRIPS.
Specifically, the authors added that TRIPS Article 31 permits
compulsory licenses for ANY reason, including the historically sanctioned
grounds of insufficient working of an invention in the country. This
flexibility was explicitly clarified in the 2001 Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Similarly, TRIPS leaves countries free
to define patentability criteria, including to define what is not an invention.
Along the same lines, each member of the WTO has the sovereign right to
determine and establish the threshold for the nonobviosuness/inventivestep requirement. Thus, the authors asserted that India is within its rights to
establish that the new forms or uses of existing and known molecules that
do not significantly increase the therapeutic effectiveness of such
substances are not entitled to patent protection. Finally, the authors pointed
out that most of the questions on the survey used by ITC remained
irrelevant to the task of ascertaining whether India’s policies violate TRIPS.
With that as the background, the following paper highlights the
submissions and testimonials of the authors at the ITC. The paper can be
divided into two main parts. Part I responds to the issues that the ITC
considered with reference to India’s patent legislation. In this, the testimony
traces the history of India’s patents, outlines the recent changes that were
implemented under the 2005 amendment to the legislation particularly
highlighting how these changes remained fully TRIPS compliant. The
second section7 addresses India’s policies on agriculture and highlights how
these policies are compliant with the TRIPS Agreement. The conclusion
highlights that

7

Professor Brook Baker did not sign on to the section on Agriculture submitted to the
International Trade Commission.
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PART I: PATENTS
1. India Patent History:
India, like many developing countries around the world, reformed
its patent laws during its period of most rapid industrialization to tailor
them to its domestic social and economic needs. What is important about
this history is that the WTO TRIPS agreement restricted the range of
options available to India and other countries in effecting such tailoring,
but did not alter the goal itself. Indeed, the Preamble and Articles 7 and 8
of TRIPS clearly and forcefully posit that countries retain the sovereign
ability to adjust their intellectual property laws and their implementation to
serve local needs. The Preamble of TRIPS recognizes an “underlying public
policy objective of national systems for the protection of intellectual
property, including developmental and technological objectives.”8 Article 7
reiterates this position that the TRIPS’ objective to protect and enforce IP
rights “should contribute . . . to a balance of rights and obligations” of
members in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.9 Article 8
recognizes members’ rights to adopt public interest or public health
measures consistent with the TRIPS provisions.10 The right of WTO
Members to take local realities into account and to adapt TRIPS’s minimum
standards pluralistically is further clarified in TRIPS Article 1.1.11
Historically, India embraced process-patent-only protection in
specified fields rather than product patent protection, particularly for food
and pharmaceuticals, in order to prioritize domestic issues like access to
medication and food security. India was not alone. In the period before
TRIPS, nearly 50 countries exempted pharmaceuticals from product patent
protection and an additional 10 exempted pharmaceuticals from process
patents as well.12

8

Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994),
reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365
(1995) [hereinafter TRIPS] at art. 27(1).
9 Id. art. 7.
10 Id. art. 8.
11 Id. art. 1.1
12 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 302 (2001).
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The Indian Patent Act of 1970,13 (IP70) along with other
mechanisms such as drug and industrial policies were all part of the
repertoire of tools used by India to achieve its national priorities. In gist,
the process patent regime of IP70 excluded protection of the end-product,
but protected the method or the process of making the product. The
process patent regime encouraged competitive innovation in the methods
of making known products, thus, it enabled production of products
patented elsewhere using different processes, incentivizing the development
of more efficient production processes. The system’s encouragement for
process innovation was the first step to establishing India’s generic drug
industry, much like how Germany established its chemical process
industries in the 1800s. Under IP70, the term of process protection over
food, drug, and medical inventions was limited to five years.14 A license of
right authorized any person to manufacture a patented product, without
having to seek the patentee’s approval.15 Inventions relating to food,
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, were automatically deemed to be endorsed
with a license of right three years after the patent issues. Further, the
government could, in the public interest, compulsorily license the patent if
the invention was either not reasonably priced or not worked to satisfy the
reasonable requirements of the public.
2. Changes Under the 2005 Amendment:
Many of these policies – although not their ultimate aims, were
required to be changed by TRIPS. India has been faithful to its obligations
under TRIPS, amending its Patent Act and taking many other measures at
considerable expense to comply with its obligations while maintaining what
flexibility it has under TRIPS to continue to further legitimate domestic
policies. Indeed, in many respects India has been more forthcoming in
amending its laws and policies to comply with TRIPS than has the United
States.
i. Pharmaceutical Product Patent Regime:
India’s most important TRIPS-fulfilling amendment—the
institution of a pharmaceutical product patent regime—was instituted in
13 See Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450 (1979) (hereinafter IP70).
14 Id. § 53(1)(a) (1979).
15 Id. § 88.
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2005. India had previously adopted the TRIPS compliant international
standard of patentability based on the requirements of novelty, inventive
step, and industrial applicability (utility) with respect to other fields of
technology. India was required to grant patents on pharmaceutical product
inventions as well as process inventions because the TRIPS Agreement
prevents discrimination against particular fields of technology.
India’s definition of novelty or “new invention” includes world-wide
prior art which was was much broader than the requirement that prevailed
in the United States under 35 U.S.C. § 102, under which any use of the
application material within the United States (only) defeated novelty. Only
in 2011 would the America Invents Act introduce the concept of
worldwide novelty,16 even though this provision was heavily criticized as
obstructing small-scale industries.
India’s inventive step requirement requires that the “feature of an
invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing
knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the
invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”17 This requirement for
inventive step has been widely noted as being much more stringent than the
nonobvious requirement in the United States, but many countries have
different, indeed stricter standards for inventive step than does the United
States.18 In fact, the U.S.’s weak standard has been a significant causative
factor for the degenerating quality of the patents in the U.S.
India has also adopted, within the framework of allowable pluralism
under TRIPS, a stronger definition of industrial applicability than the
United States. The United States’ weaker standard of utility has historically
allowed the patenting of business methods and other more abstract
16 Leahy Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, (H.R 1249) at § 102.
17 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, at § 2(ja)
(hereinafter PTA, 2005); See also Srividhya Ragavan and Feroz Ali Khader, Proof of
Progress: The Role of Obviousness Standard in the Indian Patent Office, GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW (FORTHCOMING). Ed. Ruth Okediji, Margo Bagley,
Jay Erstling. Oxford University Press, 2014 (discussing how the standards of
obviousness in India sets a higher bar when compared to the United States).
18 See, e.g., Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A
Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2004); Request for Comments on the
International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of Patent Law, 66
Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,409–11 (Mar. 19, 2001) (listing seventeen differences

between U.S. patent law and the law of other developed countries).
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innovations, unlike India and many other countries that either exclude such
matters as unpatentable or consider them not to have industrial
applicability. This is one of many permissible policy differences allowed
under TRIPS. In this regard, it is also important to note that India has
codified a number of exclusions to patentability that are similarly excluded
by many other countries – abstract ideas, theories of science, plants and
animals, etc., even where the same creations could subject to patent in the
U.S. Perhaps the most important exclusion from patentability, discussed
further below, is India’s Section 3(d).
ii. Section 3(d):19
Section 3(d) does the important function of segregating patents that result
in evergreening from those that represent a true innovation. Basically, new
forms of known compounds that exhibit enhanced efficacy will cross the
threshold and be considered innovative. Other forms that merely represent
a new form of a known substance without making any therapeutic
contribution to the disease in question will fail the bar. Unlike the
suspicions expressed under the USTR’s Special 301 report of 2013, section
3(d) does not represent an unauthorized fourth requirement because the
applicability of this section is limited to one small question in one subject
matter.20 Section 3(d) has no universal application, which would be essential
had it been conceived as a fourth requirement. Similarly, the requirement in
section 3(d), as mentioned earlier, is no different from the requirement
imposed for similar compositions in the United States. That is, in the
United States, the Manual for Patent Examination Procedure in sections
716.02 and 2144.09 at paragraph VII discuss the use of “unexpected
advantages” or “superior properties” to determine obviousness of such
structurally similar compounds.21 Further, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in several decisions has reiterated the requirement of
“unexpected results” or “surprising effect” as tests to determine
patentability of the new forms of known substances.22 These kinds of
19 Id. at § 3(d)
20 See 2013 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
available at www.ustr.gov
21 Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, at sections 716 , 2144 available at
www.uspto.gov.
22 Id.
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criteria are not measurably different form the efficacy requirement that
India uses to assess patentability.
Granting secondary patents, which promotes evergreening, is a
controversial issue not just in India but also in the United States.23 The term
evergreening refers to strategically patenting different forms of a medicine’s
active ingredients, new uses, and/or new formulations and staggering such
protection to extend monopoly control over various forms/uses of the
medicine beyond the 20-year term of protection. The steady lowering of
standards, especially for determining nonobviousness, has in turn
contributed to such strategic patenting, which is now subject of much
scrutiny in the United States.
The struggles of the United States with a barrage of secondary
patents on medicines have served as a lesson to other countries, including
India.24 In essence, India is trying hard to prevent issues that the United
States is currently facing on account of unduly lowering the bar to facilitate
more patents. In gist, low patent standards can dangerously interfere with
follow-on innovations and unjustly reward very low levels of innovation.
For countries like India, the effect of such lowering on innovation is quite
onerous in terms of pharmaceutical costs and untreated patients. Thus, it is
important to appreciate that invalidating patents of multinational
companies is not a sign of TRIPS noncompliance as long as such
invalidation is done using lawful patentability standards and nondiscriminatory processes as required by the TRIPS agreement. In the
United States such patents are easily issued although they can be invalidated
by litigation. But, rather than accepting the resource investment, cost,
judicial time and the loss of access to the public inherent in the U.S. model
for combating evergreening, India’s Section 3(d), enacted in the 2005
amendment,25 prohibits patenting of new uses of known substances,
including medicines. Similarly, patenting new forms of known substances is
not allowed unless there is evidence of significantly enhanced efficacy. The
logic of this interesting provision is along the exact lines of the opinion of
23 See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2002
24 See Thomas Faunce and Joel Lexchin, Linkage' Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and
Australia, Aust -New Zealand Health Policy (Biomed Central) (2007);
EVERGREENING OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET PROTECTION, EUROPEAN GENERIC
MEDICINES ASSOCIATION.
25 PTA, supra note 9, § 3(d).
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the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the case of Pfizer v.
Apotex involving the Pfizer’s patenting of the besylate form of amlodipine
(salt form) which Apotex claimed was obvious in the light of Pfizer’s own
patent on the base compound amlodipine.26 The CAFC, in agreeing with
Apotex that the patent on the besylate form was invalid, highlighted the
besylate form lacked the unexpected superior results from the base compound
in order for the salt form to be patented.27 Indeed, the Manual for Patent
Examination Procedure in section 716.02 and in 2144.09 specifically
memorializes unexpected results as a test to demonstrate nonobviousness of
structurally similar compounds like isomers and homologues.28 Thus,
India’s standard is well within the lines of what has been allowed in the
United States.
The Novartis judgment, which has become central to Congressional
criticism of India’s IP regime, was decided significantly on the basis of the
absence of any evidence of enhanced efficiency, a valid criteria for assessing
patentability as described above.29 In essence, the Supreme Court of India,
in a well-reasoned decision, found that beta-crystalline form of imatinib
mesylate, was revealed and claimed in a pre-TRIPS patent and thus was
time barred from patentability in India unless it showed significantly
enhanced efficacy.30 Unfortunately for Novartis, the Supreme Court of
India found that Novartis offered no evidence of increased efficacy of the
relevant compound whatsoever, and thus that the patent was unmeritorious
under section 3(d).31 Whatever the effect ton Novartis’s bottom line or on
balance of payments with the U.S., this was an eminently reasonable, and
TRIPS-permissible, decision.
TRIPS does not require its member countries to be persuaded by
the issue patents of other countries. The argument that several other
countries agreed that Gleevec was patentable despite being a mere variation
of an existing, previously patented chemical entity is inconsequential to
India’s own patent determination. If a country chooses to adopt a higher
bar for determining patentable subject matter and/or inventive step under
26 Pfizer v. Apotex, 488 F. 3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
27 480 F.3d at 1368; see also In re Swain, 33 C.C.P.A. 1266, 156 F.2d 246, 247–48 (1946).
28 Manual for Patent Examination Procedure § 2144, § 716 (8th ed., rev. 2012).
29 Novartis AG v. Union Of India & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 2706-2716 of 2013.
30 Id
31 Id.
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TRIPS, it is well within the member’s rights to do so. Indeed, Japan has a
record of allowing approximately 14% of patents that are granted in the
United States. Having a higher bar with standards is well within the rights
of a sovereign nation and well-established under the principles of the World
Trade Organization. India’s Section 3(d) and the Novartis judgment fall
well within the ambit of the TRIPS agreement.
Indeed, as India transitions into a full-fledged patent regime, it is
well-worth remembering Justice Breyer’s cautionary note in Laboratory
Corporation v. Metabolite:32 “sometimes [patents] presence can discourage
research …, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising
the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.”33
He advocates that patent law should carefully seek to avoid the dangers of
overprotection just as surely as it should avoid diminished incentives
resulting from under protection.34 Section 3(d) is an important tool to serve
the end of rewarding true innovation while refusing to grant exclusive
rights for trivial, incremental changes. Further, in instituting section 3(d)
and in setting a higher patentability bar, a developing country like India
would rightly avoid the some of the excessive patenting problems that seem
to plague the United States.
iii. Opposition Procedure:
Another important feature, the opposition mechanism, embodies a
pre– as well as a post-grant opposition procedure.35 Pre-grants opinions
conserve administrative time otherwise spent on examining a patent
application that could later be invalidated, in addition to preserving judicial
time. As for the procedure, under § 25, any third party can oppose a patent
after publication of the application and before the grant for reasons of
patentability, wrongful acquisition, inadequate disclosures, etc. 36 On similar
grounds, any interested person may oppose the patent within one year of
the grant of patent.37 The grant structure circumvents one of the India’s
debilitating constraints, being the backlog in the judicial system. Hence, the
32 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127, 126 S. Ct.
2921 (2006) (Breyer., J with whom Stevens J., and Souter J., join, dissenting).
33 Id
34 Id.
35 PTA, supra note 9, at, §§ 18, 35.
36 Id., § 25 (c), (e), (h).
37 Id., 89, § 25(k);
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grant opinions seemingly have more economic value when compared to the
USPTO’s administrative opinions, for instance, not least because there are
few judicial opinions on the question of inventiveness, but perhaps also
because of the influence of a combination of other factors such as the time
taken to resolve disputes in India.
WIPO has researched opposition procedures in depth and found
substantial variation in countries approaches to both pre- and post-grant
procedures, but clearly does not consider them unauthorized by TRIPS.
Indeed, TRIPS Article 62.4 explicitly references and thus indirectly
condones the use of opposition procedures.
iv. Intellectual Property Office Modernization:
When India amended its patent legislation, the government of India
through the Department of Commerce modernized the different
intellectual property offices at great expense.38 Additionally, India has
worked to relieve patent disputes from the most debilitating constraint of
all: the Indian Court system. India has established the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board (IPAB), as the special appellate administrative tribunal
from 2007 to hear patent appeals from the decisions of the Controller
(provided it includes a technical member).39 Akin perhaps, to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the United States, the review of the
decision of the IPAB can be sought by the losing party by filing a writ
petition on the grounds that there is a question of law requiring the
attention of the High Court or that there is illegality or miscarriage of
justice. The Supreme Court of India has established that all decisions of
tribunals including the IPAB are subject to review before the Division
Benches of the High Court (two-judge benches) within whose jurisdiction
the concerned tribunal falls.40 The establishment of the IPAB signifies
India’s commitment to implementing the patent statute.

38 Press Release, Department of Commerce (India), Government’s Initiatives in
Revamping Intellectual Property Show Results (Feb. 7, 2002).
39 Notifications No.12/15/2006-IPR-III (2/4/2007), Ministry of Commerce & Industry,
(India).
40 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 (1997) (India); See
also Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President of Madras Bar Association, (2010) 5
SCALE 514.
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v. Compulsory Licensing:
India has one of the most sophisticated compulsory licensing
provisions of any country -- one that fully conforms to the TRIPS
agreement as clarified by the Doha Declaration.
Section 84 of the Indian patent statue allows the government to
compulsorily license a patent three years after grant.41 Applicants seeking
compulsory licenses should provide proof that the applicant attempted to
negotiate a license with the patent owner as required under the TRIPS
agreement, and must do so for a minimum period of six months.42 As for
the grounds, third parties can seek a license on the grounds that the (a)
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented
invention have not been satisfied, (b) that the patented invention is not
available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or (c) that the
patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.43 The term
reasonable requirements of the public is broad and can be deemed to be not
satisfied if an existing industry or trade in India is affected; the demand for
a patented article is not met by the patent holder, or the market is affected
directly or because of the patent holder’s activities. These grounds are fully
in accord with traditional grounds for compulsory licenses dating back to
the earliest patent laws, and explicitly sanctioned in Paris Convention
Article 5(A).
Under Section 92, a compulsory license can be granted where the
government provides notice of the existence of a national emergency such
as a public health crisis or where it intends to use the patented subject
matter for non-commercial public use.44
Section 90(1)(vii) allows for export of non-predominate quantities
compulsorily licensed products and Section 92A requires export of
patented pharmaceuticals to “any country having insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned
product to address public health problems, provided compulsory licence
has been granted by such country or such country has, by notification or
41
42
43
44

See PTA, supra note 9, at § 84.
Id., § 84(5)(4).
Id., § 84.
Id. § 92.
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otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products
from India.”.
India’s provisions with reference to compulsory licensing are fully
compliant under Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement. Generally, TRIPS
allows countries to determine the grounds for issuing compulsory licensing.
In any event, India has issued only one compulsory license so far and did so
in a case where there was egregious pricing and lack of supply to the
market. Although U.S. critics have focused on the local-working rationale
of the Patents Office decision granting a compulsory license, there were in
fact three independent grounds for the license: insufficient supply,
excessive pricing, and lack of an adequately explained total failure to work
locally. Each or any of these grounds, including local working, is legally
sufficient and justified under international and national law.45 India was
well-within its rights to issue the license on Bayer.46
In any event, the facts of the Bayer situation demonstrates that for
the United States to expect India to not take steps because Bayer or other
companies feel that is unfair would be at the cost of its political leadership
position. In gist, at a time when India housed approximately 20,000 patients
with liver cancer and about 9,000 patients with kidney cancer between the
years 2008 to 2010, a negligible amount of Bayer’s Sorafenib was imported
into the country. In fact, no importation ensued in 2008, a year when Bayer
recorded a worldwide profit of over $678 million in the rest of the world.
The patent holder’s inability to fulfill its duty of catering to the demands of
the market notwithstanding, Bayer’s pricing of the drug bordered on the
ridiculous. The selling price which Bayer charged at an egregious price of
Rs.2,80,428 per month (about $5,000) was nearly five times higher than the
median annual income in India. Indeed, as a mark of its careful scrutiny, the
Indian patent office rejected an application to compulsorily license
Dasatinib.
It is most important to consider the actual context of income
inequality and excessive pricing in India, which minimizes U.S. sales and
profits in India, as well as against the general trend of trade with India,

45 Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working and Compulsory Licenses
Under International Law, 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 243 (1997).
46 See generally, Srividhya Ragavan, Patients Win Over Patents, THE HINDU, (March 7, 2013).
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which is quite profitable for the U.S. Overall, U.S. pharmaceutical exports
have been steadily rising, as shown in the figure below:47

Source: World Trade Organization
According to trade data from the World Trade Organization, U.S.
pharmaceutical exports rose from $39 million to $225 million during the
period 2000-2012. This is an increase of 470%.
Furthermore, U.S. pharmaceutical exports to India are growing at a
faster rate than U.S. pharmaceutical exports to the world as a whole. Since
the Patents Act was amended in 2005, export growth in India has outpaced
overall world growth in six out of eight years.

Source: World Trade Organziation
47 From the post-hearing submissions of the authors to the USTR
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Source: World Trade Organization
It is notable that there has not been a single compulsory license
granted on an American product. The one compulsory license issued has
been on a patent held by Bayer, a German firm.

Bayer’s market price and “access price” for Nexavar were both
unaffordable to most of the Indian population.
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At the ITC hearings, representatives from Bayer, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and others, noted that Bayer was making the
drug available at a lower “access price” in India. However, if one converts
the full price and access price to U.S. dollars (based on a January 2013
exchange rate) and compares them to the average annual income-byquintile, the data shows that both prices exceed annual income of even the
top 20%.

Sources: Income and income distribution data from World Bank; Prices from
the Nexaver compulsory license
This reality has to be weighed against the fact that in India,
insurance coverage exists broadly for not more than about 5 to 20% of the
population.48 Most Government sponsored schemes have a cap of Rs.
48 E-mail from Professor Surupa Gupta, University of Mary Washington, (Feb 12, 2014)
(on file with the author, Ragavan).
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30,000 (approx.. $ 500) and is limited to hospitalization. Further,
domiciliary treatment (medication) is not covered as part of most insurance
in India.49 Within this, the market shows enormous variations. Much of the
insurance is privately acquired as opposed to Government sponsored or as
part of employee benefits. It is estimated that the annual pay-out for those
who have insurance is in the range of $1500-2000.50
vi. Bolar Provision:
Sections 107A, a bolar-type or “early working” provision,
introduced via the 2005 amendment, allows for storage of patented material
during the patent term to facilitate marketing immediately after the
expiration of the patent term.51 Use of the patent for research, data
gathering, and seeking regulatory-approval, both domestically and abroad,
are exempted from being construed as infringement. The New Delhi High
Court approved the operation and the constitutionality of the provision in
Bayer v. Cipla.52 Such regulatory exceptions fall within the ambit of Article
30 which allows every country to consider the legitimate interests of third
parties in structuring such exceptions. Indeed, bolar exceptions have been
considered in a WTO dispute opinion of a panel “Canada — Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical Products” - (adopted on 7 April 2000)
upholding Canada’s bolar and regulatory exceptions, similar to that of
India’s. Even though the U.S. has attempted to block the use of Bolar type
provisions to allow a patent exception for purposes of exporting patent
protected subject matter for purposes of obtaining regulatory approval in
some of its bilateral and regional trade agreements, it is completely lawful
for countries like India to allow such foreign registration as a limited
exception under Article 30.

49 E-mail from Mr. D. G. Shah, Vision-India Limited, (Feb 23, 2014) (on file with the
author, Ragavan).
50 E-mail from Professor Surupa Gupta, University of Mary Washington, (Feb 12, 2014)
(on file with the author, Ragavan).
51 Patents Act, supra note 9, at § 107(A)
52 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2009)41 PTC 634(Del).
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vii. Exhaustion of Patent Rights:
Section 107A(b) embraces an international exhaustion of the rights
of a patent owner.53 Thus, the sale or importation into India of a legally
procured patented item from anywhere in the world will not amount to
infringement.54 That is, there is no need for authorization by the patentee
or his assignee as long as the product was sold with due permission of the
patent owner (or assignee). In fact, even importation of a product acquired
from sources other than the patent owner (or assignee), for instance, from
countries not yet recognizing product patent protection, would be covered
by the section. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement explicitly allows members
to choose a regime of exhaustion and ensures that they be challenged under
the WTO dispute settlement system. The Doha Declaration, under
paragraph 5, has reaffirmed that Members do have this right, stating that
each Member is free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge.55
viii: Criticisms about revocation of patents in India
Several statements and submissions to the ITC and the USTR,
including that of BIO, criticized India for patent revocations through postgrant reviews by courts or the Patent Office.56
First, establishing judicial standards (or statutory interpretation)
goes to the core of an independent judiciary. The General Obligations
outlined from Article(s) 41 to 61 of the TRIPS agreement supposes the
establishment of an independent judiciary with rights and authorities that
are consistent with that sovereign government. Under traditional principles
of international law, no country, much less industrial groups, can dictate the
constituents of “judicial standards” of another country. The United States
53 PTA, supra note 9, § 107A(b)
54 Id. § 107A(b).
55 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994).
56 See Bio’s submission to the ITC, page 4 (complaining of “counterfeiting, large
backlogs and patent office inefficiency, differing administrative, legal, and judicial
standards for patentability, compulsory licensing, inadequate data protection, and a
need for harmonization of substantive standards and processes across patent offices
around the world. Issues unique to biotechnology include patentability of
biotechnology inventions, double patent review systems, genetic resource access and
benefit regimes, and technology transfer issues that involve intellectual property.”)
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has not and will not tolerate foreign interference into the functioning of its
judiciary, and no other country should likewise accept such criticism.
Page 8 of the BIO submission complains specifically about several patent
revocations:
The Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB)
revoked several pharmaceutical patents in post-grant
opposition proceedings in the last two years including patents
protecting Sutent, Pegasys, Ganfort, Combigan, and Renadyl.
Notably, a close comparison of the reasoning used by the Indian
patents office shows remarkable parallels to the reasoning used by U.S.
courts to invalidate patents here in the United States. As an example, in the
following paragraphs, I examine Ganfort & Combigan’s (which was one
application for a combination drug) treatment in the United States.
In India, Ganfort and Combigan were covered by Patent
No.212695 titled “Hypotensive Lipid (prostaglandin derivatives) and
Timolol composition and methods of using same" The patent related to a
fixed combination of Bimatoprost and Timolol.57 The patent was
challenged as being obvious on the grounds that the only big difference
between the invention and the prior art was that the invention was a single
dose composition as opposed to separate administration of the
combination.58 The patent was invalidated in India for not traversing the
nonobviousness requirement.
The interesting aspect which BIO does not highlight is that fact that
in Allergan Inc vs. Sandoz,59 a full panel Court of Appeals for the Court of
Appeals for Federal Circuit in dealing with Combigen’s claim one
INVALIDATED the claim on the grounds that “unexpected results and
prior art teaching away were NOT sufficient to outweigh the other
evidence of obviousness.”60
57 Application for Patent bearing No. 219504
58 Anubha Sinha, IPAB revokes Allergan's patent on eye drugs Ganfort and Combigan,
SpicyIP, (2013)
59 Allergan
v.
Sandoz,
Fed.
Cir,
2013
available
at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/11-1619.Opinion.425-2013.1.PDF
60 Id.
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Both timolol (a beta blocker) and brimodine (an alpha2agonist) were commercially available in their claimed
concentrations at the time of the invention and were used to
treat opthalmic conditions. The primary prior art reference,
DeSantis, expressly taught serially administering both a beta
blocker, such as timolol, with a brimodine in a fixed
combination. It also provided "an express motivation to
combine alpha2-agonists and beta blockers in order to
increase patient compliance." Slip Op. at 8.
The equivalent in India of the unexpected results test used in the
United States is the enhanced efficacy. A Federal Circuit panel validated the
method claim – with Judge Dyk filing a dissent asserting the invalidity of
the claim.
Indeed, the IPAB opinion states that:
“We too are of the opinion like the Federal Court that there
was a reasonable expectation of success in view of the
DeSantis. Therefore for the above reason, we find that the
invention is obvious."61
In India, a limited number of claims were filed and hence, only
these were contested. In the U.S., even though Sandoz succeeded in
establishing that claims of ‘463 patent were invalid as obvious, the number
of filed claims were more and the Federal circuit ruled that some of those
claims (4 of 149) were not obvious, and that delayed the entry of the
generic.
Similarly, with respect to the drug Pegasys, the application to patent
was filed by Roche in 1997 for “pegylated interferon alfa2a.” The
application matured into a patent in 2006 bearing no. 198952. A post-grant
opposition was filed by a local companies on the grounds that interferon is
a known protein, which when conjugated with the polymer PEG through
the process of PEGylatio (a process of covalent attachment of polyethylene
glycol polymer chains to another molecule or therapeutic protein) achieves
improved stability, solubility, and reduced immunogenicity. Interestingly,

61 Ajanta Pharma v. Allergan USA, available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/173-2013.htm
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Roche was able to traverse this opposition at the patent office level. On
appeal, the IPAB’s explained its reasoning for invalidating the patent as
obvious as follows:
“Interferon had already been used to treat hepatitis C. There
were problems in the use of this protein as such. PEGylation
was known from 1970s. Pegylation of proteins was known to
improve the activity of the proteins. There was intense
activity in the field of PEG chemistry and the person skilled
in the art will be acquainted with it, if not directly involved in
it. Linear conjugates of protein showed improvement over
unconjugated protein. …the person of skill In the art takes a
look at Monfardini and also at the other exhibits. He knows
that the activity of interferon has to be improved for
Hepatitis C cases. He knows that linear pegylation will
improve it a bit. He knows that branched pegylation has
shown marked improvement over linear conjugates in the
case of superoxide dismutase and three enzymes. He is
confident that branched PEGylation of Interferon will work;
it has worked in Monfardini with enzymes. Monfardini gives
him the structure on a platter. He also knows that he can
work with molecular weight range of 5000-40,000 daltons to
strike oil. He has reason to believe that higher may be better.”
It is understandable that Roche does not like the judgment – but
the above paragraph(s) show case due process and a reasoned judgment in
action.
Notwithstanding the above, India recorded at that time a total of 10
to 12 million patients suffering from Hepatitis C – for which Pegasys
offered a treatment. A six-month treatment of pegasys cost approximately
Rs. 4,36,000 lakhs (approx. $ 8400!) and was discounted at a price of
approximately Rs. 3,14,000 lakhs ($ 6000). The drug is taken in
combination with Ribavarin, which cost approximately another Rs. 47,000
thousand ($1000). Given the cost, roughly, a total of 1400 patients were
treated.62 Yet, it was patented in India until it was invalidated and was NOT
ever subject to compulsory licensing.

62

Id.
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Similarly, another drug cited by BIO - Sunitinib, (Sutent) - whose 50
mg tablets were marketed by Pfizer for an exorbitant price of Rs. 61,000 for
a strip of seven tablets ($ 1200 approximately) was also not subject to
compulsory licenses. What BIO does not add here is the fact that its
members cannot sell these drugs even to its American patients at this price,
save for “the 1%” in this country.63
Similarly, many of the other issues that BIO as well as other
industry groups like PhRMA decry equally lack adequate basis. For
instance, in Mayo v. Prometheus64 a unanimous Supreme Court struck down a
method of medical treatment claim as being directed to a law of nature and
thus patent ineligible! Thus, exclusions from patentability are not alien to
the U.S. legal system. Other countries exclude such claims from protection.
For example, in Canada methods of medical treatment are not patentable
under section section 12.04.02 of its Manual of Patent Office Procedure.
Further, TRIPS Article 27.3 further allows for such exclusions.
As for revocation of patents, BIO’s and this industry group’s
statement leaves the impression that revocation of patents is a rare and
unusual phenomenon! The following data examines two hundred and
eighty (283) three cases where Federal District Courts have examined the
patent validity between 2007 and 2011. Of the 283 cases identified, only in
39 cases were the claims determined to be valid. The following table
provides a detailed summary:

63

Prashanth Reddy, Estimating the number of Hepatitis patients treated by Roche's
Pegasus (2012)

64 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)
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About 243 of the 283 cases had claims that were invalidated by the
District Court. That is, in a whopping 86% of the total cases examined,
claims were invalidated.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is also not shy of
invalidation of claims where the court believes is warranted. The following
graph provides the number of patents invalidated by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit from 2002 to 2012.

Source: White Paper Report; United States Patent Invalidity Study, 2012.
Revoking patents merely point to a robust judiciary reviewing
imperfect decisions by harried patent examiners. Several of the submission
decries patent revocations in India as if denials/revocations/invalidations
never occur anywhere else. The sophistication of a patent system is not in
the numbers of patents issued. It is in the quality of patents. Decreasing the
bar for patenting in the United States is cited as a reason for the Supreme
Court’s unprecedented activity in this area of law. Academics have decried
the pathetic quality of patents in this country. Forums like the International
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Trade Commission has a burden to ensure that it does not set the United
States on a course to punish others countries for instituting quality based
standards.
PART II: AGRICULTURE
India, like other developing nation counterparts, took advantage of the
flexibilities in Article 27(3) of the TRIPS agreement which mandates
establishing a protection regime “either by patents or by enacting an effective
sui generis system.” In light of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, the effectiveness of
a plant protection regime established under Article 27 must be judged by its
ability to accommodate local/ national welfare and economic goals. Such a
reading of the effectiveness requirement fits more comfortably with the other
sub-sections of Article 27 which provides that members may choose to
protect biological or microbiological materials. Member’s flexibility to
establish an effective system increases when using a national yardstick.
Considering this, India enacted the Protection of Plant Varieties and
Farmers Rights Act of 2004 (PPVFA)65 under which three separate varieties
can be registered, being: (1) New Variety; (2) Extant Variety, which refers
to an existing variety discovered for the first time; and (c) Farmer’s Variety,
based on community property concepts.66
i. New variety: A variety would be eligible for protection as new provided it
is novel, distinct, uniform, and stable—a threshold similar to the UPOV
requirements. 67 Examination guidelines set out the principles used for
testing the distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS Guidelines) of a
variety to determine its registration status.68 Information such as (1) the
geographical origin of the material; and (2) any contribution by farmer,
community, or organization to the development of the variety, (3)
information about the use of genetic material conserved by any tribal or
rural families in the breeding are required to be given in the application.69
65 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, No. 53 of 2001; INDIA
CODE (2001), [hereinafter “PPVFA”]
66 Id, § 15(2).
67 Id. § 15.
68 See General Guidelines for the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability
and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions, Protection of Plants Varieties &
Farmers’ Rights Authority, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Government
of India, NASC Complex, IARI, New Delhi-110012 [hereinafter “DUS Guidelines”]
69 Id. § 18(1)(e), 40.
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ii. Extant Variety: In order to ensure that an appropriate bar is instituted in
a country that is rich in biodiversity and traditional farming practices, the
extant variety register was created to as a compilation of matters known and
existing in the public domain. This classification indirectly creates a higher
bar to determine distinctiveness of a new variety. Indeed, the extant variety
classification takes care of India’s obligation under the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) to which it is a signatory.70 The Convention
requires member states to take adequate steps to preserve biological and
genetic materials. Section 28 of the PPVFA provides that the government,
as the owner of the extant varieties, enjoys the right to determine their
production, sale, marketability, distribution, importation, or exportation.
Government ownership over the materials ties in with the objective of
protecting biodiversity and allowing the government to negotiate with
bioprospectors. An Extant Variety Recommendation Committee (EVRC)
develops appropriate procedures for examining applications to register an
extant variety.71 By the end of 2010, from a pool of 297 applications, 123
extant varieties were registered.
iii. Farmer’s Variety: Within this variety typology fall plants which are
traditionally cultivated and evolved by the farmers in their fields, or is a wild
relative or land race of a variety about which the farmers possess the
common knowledge.72 The reason for protecting farmers’ rights is the
underlying assumption that genetic diversity is enhanced when varieties are
adapted using traditional farming techniques.73 By 2010, after considering
44 applications three varieties of rice—Indrasan, Hansraj, and Tilak
Chandan—became the first of the farmer’s varieties registered in India, and
perhaps, also in the world.
Other features of the PPVFA are all part of the sui generis system that allows
a country to tailor a regime that protects plant varieties while making
adequate allowances for local issues. The creation of the Gene Fund, for
instance, is another feature created by the central government for the
benefit of the farmers.74 The fund helps reward farmers whose existing
70 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
“CBD”].
71 See Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Regulations, 2006, Gazette of
India, Notification (Dec. 7, 2006).
72 PPVFA, supra note 38, § 2(l).
73 Id.
74 See PPVFA, supra note 38, §s 39, 45.
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variety/material is used as a source to create a new variety.75 Similarly, the
PPVFA allows farmers to retain their traditional right to save and reuse
seeds from their harvests with some restrictions and conditions. The
PPVFA has also introduced a right to community compensation in
recognition of traditional knowledge contributions. Section 43 reflects a
community property philosophy by providing that “[b]reeders wanting to
use farmers’ varieties for creating essentially derived varieties (EDVs)
cannot do so without the express permission of the farmers.”76 Thus,
communities can stake a claim of contribution from breeders if a new
variety is derived from information or a contribution is made by the local
community.77 If the community’s claim for compensation is established, the
breeder must deposit the compensation in the Gene Fund.78 Lastly, the
PPVFA provides for “benefit sharing” – which refers to sharing a
proportion of the benefits accruing to a breeder of a new variety with
qualifying claimants, if any, who could be indigenous groups, individuals, or
communities.79 That concept, first envisaged in the CBD, has been more
clearly expounded on the PPVFA and structured to work closely with the
community rights principle detailed earlier. Thus, the statute mandates that
before registering any new variety, the statutory authority should invite
claims for benefit sharing.80
CONCLUSION81
Along with the above testimonial, the authors also filed detailed posthearing reports both to the ITC and the USTR addressing questions and
concerns that were raised by the Commissioners during the hearing. The
authors highlighted that taking any step that affects India detrimentally will
be a strategic mistake for all of the following reasons:

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. § 39.
See PPVFA, supra note 38, § 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 2(b), 26.
Id. § 26.
See International Trade Commission, Report on Investigation No. 332-543, available at
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2014/er1222ll254.htm (for details
of the ITC’s Report on the Investigation); See also USTR Special 301 Report, available
at www.ustr.gov (for details of the USTR’s Report on its Investigation of India’s trade
practices).
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1. India has not done anything during the examination period of this
report to warrant changes;
2. Much of industry’s requests are unsupported by specific facts and
figures;
3. All of India’s actions are well-with its negotiated rights under the
TRIPS agreement; within established due-processes and procedures;
4. India is one of the few countries in that region where the United
States enjoys good public opinion;
5. Other industries, Boeing, being a great example, has no grouse with
India and its intellectual property laws.
The authors cautioned both forums forum from setting a course
that could result in labelling other countries for exercising their sovereign
powers.

